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PREFACE 
On October 26, 1993, u.s. Bureau of Mines (USBM) researchers met with the West Virginia Board 
of Coal Mine Health and Safety (WV Board) to discuss roof bolting hazards in underground coal mines. 
The WV Board had completed a nationwide investigation of roof bolting machinery-related accidents 
from 1983 through March 1993. It identified eight fatalities that involved the victim being caught be-
tween the drill boom and the top or automated temporary roof support (ATRS). The fatalities occurred 
between May 1988 and March 1993. 
As a result of this meeting, USBM researchers agreed to study human factors issues related to roof 
bolting activities and to provide a repOlt of the findings. In July 1994, a report entitled "Human Factors 
Analysis of the Hazards Associated With Roof Drilling and Bolt Installation Procedures" was presented 
to the WV Board. The report was a result of the efforts of the following members of the Mining 
Systems and Human Engineering group of the USBM's Pittsburgh Research Center: Michael Brnich, 
mining engineer; Kim Cornelius, industrial engineer; Roberta Calhoun, safety and occupational health 
specialist; Joseph DuCarme, mechanical engineer; Sean Gallagher, research physiologist; Christopher 
Hamrick, industrial engineer; Alan Mayton, mining engineer;E. William Ross~ industrial engineering 
technician; Lisa Steiner, industrial engineer; Fred Turin, industrial engineer; and Rich Unger, civil 
engineer. 
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HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS OF ROOF BOLTING HAZARDS 
IN UNDERGROUND COAL MINES 
By Fred C. Turin 1 and others 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Bureau of Mines conducted a human factors analysis of hazards associated with roofholting 
activities in underground coal mines. Emphasis was placed on hazards related to the movement of the 
drill-head boom or mast of a roof bolting machine. The objective was to identify hazards and recom-
mend solutions. The data-collection effort consisted of analysis of U.S. Min~ Safety and Health Ad-
ministration accident data; visits to underground mines and interviews with experienced roof bolting 
machine operators; discussions with roof bolting machine manufacturers; interviews with workers injured 
while performing roof bolting tasks; and reviews of research on roof bolting safety. A set of recom-
mendations to increase the safety of roof bolting operations was developed. In particular, the following 
list of recommendations was presented in ranking order: (1) use an interlock device to cut off power 
to controls when an operator is out of position, (2) place fixed barriers at pinch points, (3) provide ap-
propriate control guarding, (4) reduce fast-feed speed, (5) use automatic cutoff switches at pinch points, 
(6) redesign control bank to conform to accepted ergonomic principles, and (7) use resin insertion tools 
and resin cartridge retainers. 
















At the request of the West Virginia Board of Coal 
Mine Health and Safety (yVV Board), the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines (USBM) initiated a study of human factors issues 
related to roof bolting in underground coal mines. The 
objective of the study was to determine what hazards may 
be associated with roof bolting activities and make recom-
mendations aimed at improving operator safety. This ob-
jective is consistent with the USBM's mission to enhance 
the health and safety of the Nation's mine workers. 
Eight fatalities were identified in a report (1)' by 
the WV Board where the victim was crushed between the 
drill-head boom of a roof bolting machine and the mine 
roof or automated temporary roof support (ATRS). In 
each case, the victim activated a raise lever while posi-
tioned in a hazardous location. For this reason, the hu-
man factors analysis focused on hazards that exist during 
roof drilling and bolt installation activities. Particular em-
phasis was placed on hazards associated with movement of 
the drill-head boom or mast and use of a fast-feed drill-
head raise lever. 
Analysis work was divided into several tasks that in-
cluded interviewing bolter operators, observing roof bolting 
activities, contacting roof bolter manufacturers, analyzing 
mine accident data, and reviewing past research on roof 
bolting safety. The project team consisted of USBM 
researchers with backgrounds in engineering (industrial, 
mechanica~ mining, and civil), physiology, training, and 
safety. 
Two fatalities occurred in early 1994-February 15 and 
March 5; each involved a victim being crushed between the 
drill mast and frame of a J. H. Fletcher & Co. HDDR 
bolting maclrine. The similar nature of events that led to 
these fatalities initiated a coordinated investigation by the 
U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). 
During the course of its investigation, MSHA asked the 
USBM for assistance in developing im proved reach aides 
when rib bolting using a Fletcher HDDR bolter. A third 
crushing-type fatality involving a different style of roof 
bolter occurred on March 25, 1994, which prompted 
MSHA to organize a roof bolting maclrine committee. 
Members included representatives from MSHA, the WV 
Board, and the USBM. Four major roof bolter manufac-
turers participated as liaisons. This committee studied 
roof bolting machine safety and generated a report (2) that 
identified safety hazards present on roof bolting machines 
in use at underground mines and suggests solutions for 
some of the problems. All relevant data collected as part 
of the human factors analysis were made available to the 
roof bolting machine committee. 
METHOD 
Data collection consisted of analysis of the MSHA 
accident database, visits to underground coal mines and 
interviews with experienced roof bolter operators, discus-
sions with manufacturers of roof bolting equipment, inter-
views with miners who had been injured during roof bolter 
operations, and reviews of past research on roof bolter 
safety. After the data were analyzed, recommendations 
were developed and ranked using a structured decision 
making technique. The data-collection and recommenda-
tion ranking methods are outlined below. 
ACCIDENT DATABASE ANALYSES 
MSHA accident data mes for 1988 through 1991 were 
examined to capture roof bolter accidents that resulted in 
injury due to operator exposure to moving or active 
maclrinery. The search criteria used are listed in table 1. 
The above data were then characterized by mine seam 
height, age of victim, victim mlning experience, and time 
elapsed since the beginning of the shift. Furthermore, 16 
fatality reports for roof bolting-related accidents were 
2Italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
preceding the appendix at the end of this report. 
examined for the period January 1984 through April 1994. 
Fatalities examined were limited to those that took place 
at or near the drilling station during the bolting process or 
maintenance of the machine. 
Table 1.-Criteria used to search MSHA accident database 
Accident or injury code 
Accident injury illness. , 
Mining machine .. , . , , 
Source of Injury .. ,.,' 
Mine worker activity , , . 
Search criterion 
Machinery or powered haulage. 
Rock or roof bolting, 
Underground mining machine or drill 
steel. 
Roof bolter (drilling, Inserting bolt, 
tramming, and not elsewhere classi-
fied); machine maintenance or 
repair. 
Accident type . . . . Struck against stationary object; 
struck by powered moving object; 
caught in-under-between running or 
meshing objects; caught in-under-
between a moving and stationary 
object. 
Degree of injury. . . Injuries of all types (including fatalities), 
NOTE.-COdes and search criterion are worded as they appear in 
the database, 
MINE VISITS AND INTERVIEWS 
USBM personnel visited three underground coal mines 
to observe roof bolting activities and to interview un-
derground workers about roof bolter safety. Two of the 
mines were in western Pennsylvania and one was in south-
ern West Virginia. Miners with roof bolting experience 
were interviewed at each mine. An interview guide was 
developed to assess the miners' views about the safety 
issues associated with roof bolting. A copy of the inter-
view guide is included as an appendix to this report. Is-
sues addressed in the interview guide included demograph-
ic information, procedures used, training received, control 
layout and design of equipment, accident causes, and po-
tential solutions. Table 2 provides the seam height, type 
of bolting equipment used, and the number of interviews 
taken for each mine. 
MANUFACTURER CONTACTS 
Representatives from four major roof bolter manufac-
turers were contacted to obtain information about their 
bolting machines. These manufacturers included Fletcher, 
Eimco Coal Machinery Inc., Fairchild International, and 
Long-Airdox Co. Two visits were made to Fletcher and 
the other manufacturers were contacted by phone. The 
company representatives were asked to describe the mod-
els they manufacture and the layout of the controls for 
each model. Furthermore, they were asked if they were 
aware of any fatal accidents that occurred because of 
miners being trapped between the boom and roof or can-
opy. They also were asked if any design modifications 
were made to reduce the likelihood of such accidents. 
INTERVIEWS WITH INJURED OPERATORS 
Three miners who had experienced accidents while roof 
bolting were interviewed. The miners worked at the same 
western Pennsylvania coal mine with a 132-cm (52-in) 
3 
seam height. First, demographic data, such as age, work 
experience, and job classification, were recorded for each 
miner. Each miner then related to the interviewer the 
story of his or her particular accident. Next, followup 
questions were asked to get the miners' views on causes 
and possible solutions for roof bolting accidents, mine 
conditions at the time of the accident, and the training 
they received. 
REVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH 
The USBM has funded several research projects that 
looked at roof bolter design and safety. There have also 
been reports issued by MSHA and private companies that 
addressed roof bolter safety. These reports were studied 
for information relevant to this project. In addition, dis-
cussions about roof bolting safety have been held with 
many mining experts, including officials from MSHA, the 
United Mine Workers of America, and mine operators. 
RANKING OF HAZARD-REDUCTION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since one objective of this project was to recommend 
solutions to hazards associated with roof bolting, the 
USBM felt it was necessary to usc a structured technique 
to rank alternative recommendations. The technique cho-
sen was the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (3). AHP 
is a multicriteria decisionmaking process that was devel-
oped at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsyl-
vania by T. L. Saaty. This method was selected because it 
provides a means for taking into account mUltiple criteria 
and objectives when evaluating alternatives. Because rank-
ing alternatives becomes complex when there are multiple 
objectives, tradeoffs must be made among competing ob-
jectives. AHP is a tool that helps to break down complex 
decisions into manageable parts that can be effectively 
rated and calculates overall rankings of the alternatives 
under consideration. 
; 















Retcher HDDR, dual-head boiters with walk-through ~assis. 
Retcher Roof Ranger II bolters and Lee Norse TD 2 bolters. 












ACCIDENT DATA ANALYSES RESULTS 
The total number of accidents identified in the MSHA 
data fIles using the search criteria described in table 1 was 
613. This included five fatalities. Ninety percent of the 
victims were caught in-under-between a moving and station-
ary object. Only 1.5% of the accideuts occurred during 
equipment maintenance. The source of injury for 87% of 
the accidents was the machine, with 13% being the drill 
steel. The job title for 74% of the victims was roof bolter 
or roof bolter helper. Over 80% of the accidents occurred 
in Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
The above data were further characterized by mine 
seam height, age of victim, victim's mining experience, and 
time elapsed since the beginning of the shift. Little 
significant difference could be found between the accident 
characteristics for the selected roof bolter accidents and 
accidents for all underground coal mine workers, except 
for the category experience at this mine. Examination of 
accidents for all underground coal miners showed that the 
frequency of injury is highest for miners with 2 years or 
less experience at the mine where the injury occurred. 
However, there was a subsequent rise in injury frequency 
that was somewhat normally distributed around 12 years. 
For the select roof bolting accidents, the frequency of 
injury was highest for miners with 1 year or less experi-
ence. The injury frequency dropped rapidly until it be-
comes fairly level for miners with 3 or more years of expe-
rience at this mine. One possibility for this observable 
difference, based on interviews with miners, is that roof 
bolter operators tend to remain roof bolter operators 
while other workers are more apt to change jobs after they 
gain seniority at a mine. The most common reasons given 
for the job stability of roof bolter operators were that (1) 
roof bolter operators have the highest paid job; (2) many 
miners do not want to be roof bolter operators; and (3) 
many experienced roof bolter operators like the independ-
ent nature of the work. 
Of the 16 fatality reports examined for the period Jan· 
uary 1984 through April 1994, 11 fatalities (roof fall, etc.) 
involved the inadvertent activation (by the operator) of a 
control. Equipment maintenance was the activity cited for 
5 of the 16 fatalities. Four of the five maintenance-related 
fatalities involved the inadvertent activation of a control. 
Of the 16 fatalities, 14 involved movement of the drill· 
head boom. Of these, nine resulted in the victim being 
crushed between the boom and the mine roof, three reo 
suited in the victim being crushed between the boom and 
the canopy, one resulted in the victim being crushed be-
tween the boom and the machine frame, and one resulted 
in the victim being crushed between the boom and the 
ATRS. Only one of the accidents involved the boom being 
lowered toward the victim. Two of the sixteen fatalities in· 
valved a drill mast head and, in both cases, the victim was 
crushed between the drill head and the machine frame. 
Finally, 12 of 16 fatalities occurred in seam heights of 
152 em or less. For 2 of the 16 fatalities, there is evidence 
that the operators had to position themselves over the 
boom and into a hazardous position to see the drill steel 
or hole. 
MINE VISIT AND INTERVIEW RESULTS 
Four operators of Hetcher HDDR bolters (mine A), 
four operators of Fletcher Roof Ranger II bolters (mine 
B), and two operators of Hctcher DDO bolters (mine C) 
were interviewed (table 2). Fletcher HDDR models are 
dual·boom mast·feed machines with walk·through chassis. 
Operators work from an operator platform inside the 
HDDR chassis. Hetcher DDO and Roof Ranger II mod-
els are dual·boom, arm·feed machines. Operators work 
outside these arm· feed machines between the drill boom 
and coal rib. The interviews with Roof Ranger operators 
were conducted with workers who had experience with 
both the old Roof Ranger design (straight boom and lever 
controls) and a new Fletcher design (offset boom and 
joyslick conlrol). The interviews with DDO operators 
included workers who had experience with and without the 
two-handed fast·feed design. The following sections sum· 
marize the major issues discussed in these interviews. 
Accidental Actuation of Controls 
Based upon the interviews conducted by the USBM, 
accidental actuation of controls (i.e., choosing the wrong 
lever or bumping controls) is a relatively common occur· 
renee among roof boIler operators. Of the operators in· 
terviewed, most admitted to accidentally activating con-
trols. Those who had not done so themselves usually knew 
someone who had. It appeared from these interviews that 
choosing the wrong lever was more common than activa-
lion through bumping. One boIler operator complained 
that drill sleels would fall onto the controls from their 
storage area on top of the machine before a bracket was 
added to hold them in place. 
BoHers Getting Into Pinch Points 
Visibility was mentioned as a reason why bolter op-
erators may get into drill-head boom pinch points. This is 
a particular problem with the Roof Ranger and DDO ma-
chines working in low- to medium-seam heights. Oper-
ators said that they can imagine situations where the oper-
ator might place his or her head over the boom to see the 
drill hole. For the operators of HDDR's, the primary rea-
son cited for entering a pinch point was retrieving a stuck 
drill steel. In addition, operators of both types of roof 
bolters said that the process of resin insertion may require 
the operator to get into a pinch point. The two DDO op-
erators said that they are forced to work in an off-balance 
position closer to the boom when bolting next to the rib if 
gob is left by the continuous miner. 
Use of Fast-Feed Lever 
Operators were asked about their use of the fast-feed 
lever. The responses of the operators were fairly uniform, 
saying that the use of the fast-feed lever was limited to the 
process of lowering drill steels and pushing the bolt up 
into the mine roof. Most operators said that it was not 
used in any other way; however, one HDDR operator did 
say that some bolters drilled and bolted with the fast feed 
during rib-pinning operations. However, the operator add-
ed that this usually caused problems because the suction 
could not keep up with the drilling process. 
Operators were asked whether they felt that the fast 
feed was necessary to do their jobs. Most operators said 
that they needed the feature because it allowed them to 
keep up with the mining cycle. Some operators also said 
that the feature was necessary so that bolts would not be 
lost because of the fast-setting resin. One operator said 
that the fast feed was sometimes helpful, but was not 
absolutely necessary to do the job. 
Comparison of Old and New Roof 
Ranger Boom Designs 
Mine B (table 2) had both the old Roof Ranger design 
(straight boom and lever controls) and the new Roof 
Ranger design (offset boom and joystick control). The 
operators were questioned about the benefits and draw-
backs of the new design. In general, the operators felt 
that there was not much difference between the two, once 
they became familiar with the operation of the joystick. 
The featUres that the operators liked most about the new 
design included the better maneuverability of the drill 
head, the joystick control that made operation easier (less 
controls to operate), and the improved workstation design 
5 
that allowed more space and a better escapeway. Negative 
reactions associated with the new design were that the 
fast-feed speed was slower, it took some time to get used 
to the joystick contro~ and the controls were too far from 
the drill head. With regard to the latter, one operator was 
fairly short and had difficulty reaching the drill head while 
operating the controls. 
In summary, the operators felt that the new design was 
as safe or safer than the old design. The new design was 
considered safer in terms of the better workstation design 
(better controls and more room to work in), and a better 
head swing design. The main complaint about the new de-
sign was that it was a little slower than the old machine. 
Comparison of One- and Two-Handed 
Fast-Feed Designs 
Both mines B and C had two-handed fast-feed controls. 
Nearly all of the miners at these mines felt that the two-
handed design was safer than the old single-handed design. 
Although most operators felt it was safer, they were split 
on their overall opinion of the two-handed feature. Some 
did not like it as well as the one-handed design, but others 
said that they actually preferred the two-handed operation. 
One operator felt that it slowed bolt installation and took 
some time getting used to. 
MANUFACTURER CONTACT RESULTS 
Several visits to Fletcher were conducted. The design 
engineers at Fletcher provided information on how the 
fast-feed lever was intended to be used and what safety 
features they were incorporating into new bolter designs 
(two-handed fast feed, C-rings to replace cotter pins on 
control linkages, rubber guards on the boom arm to serve 
as a pinch-point warning, and offset booms to provide 
more workspace on their Roof Ranger model). They also 
revealed that they had investigated the possibility of put-
ting an automatic cutoff switch on the boom SO that the 
switch would be activated when it contacted an object. 
However, they were concerned that such a switch might 
be disabled, unknown to the operator, who might be rely-
ing on it to work. In addition, practical limitations to 
retrofitting these machines for safety purposes were also 
discussed. Fletcher acknowledged that it was aware of 
accidents that involved operators being crushed by the 
boom of roof bolting machines. However, Fletcher indi-
cated that these accidents were not unique to its machines. 
Fletcher's engineers agreed to cooperate with any future 
efforts on the project and to provide engineering drawings 












Other manufacturers contacted by telephone included 
Eimco, Fairchild, and Long-Airdox (Simmons Rand). 
General information concerning the design of their ma-
chines and sales literature was obtained from each. 
INJURED OPERATOR INTERVIEW SUMMARIES 
Three operators of Fletcher Roof Ranger II bolters 
(mine B) were interviewed. Each had been injured in the 
past while roof bolting. Summaries of these injuries are 
detailed below: 
1. The bolter operator was installing a 122-cm (48-in) 
full-grout resin bolt in a 117-cm (46-in) seam height. He 
was bending the bolt before he pushed it up in the hole 
when he felt pain in his lower back. 
2. The operator had just completed drilling the fIrst 
half of the inside bolt hole ( starter) and turned around to 
get the fInisher and pusher steels when a large piece of 
rock fell. The bolter operator was pinned between the 
boom and the rock. He suffered a dislocated hip, a 
cracked vertebra, torn knee cartilage, and a cracked pelvis. 
3. The bolter operator was installing a 183-cm (n-in) 
point anchor bolt with a coupler between the bolt sections. 
He was pushing the bolt up into the hole when the coupler 
hung up on the lip of the hole, causing the bolt to bow. 
The operator was holding the bolt so that it would not fall 
into the mud and reached for the fast-feed lever in an 
attempt to drop the bolter head to realign the bolt. 11Ie 
rotation lever linkage was sloppy and caused the lever to 
overlap the fast-feed lever. When the operator lifted the 
fast-feed lever, the head dropped, but the reverse rotation 
was also activated. Because he was holding the bolt when 
the reverse rotation was activated, the operator's arm was 
twisted around the bolt, resulting in a fractured right arm. 
Only one of these injuries dealt with the primary focus 
of this study and hazards associated with movement of the 
drill-head boom or mast. The cause of accident 3-inad-
vertent activation of a control-was also the cause of 9 of 
the 16 roof bolter fatalities studied and was a recurring 
theme during many of the interviews with roof bolter 
operators. 
REVIEW OF BOLTER-RELATED LITERATURE 
The USBM has sponsored several projects since the 
late 1970's that looked at roof bolter safety. Those with 
direct relevance to this project included a study on stand-
ardized controls for roof bolters,3 a study on personal 
protective equipment for underground coal miners,' a 
study of accident risk during the roof bolting cycle,' and a 
study to develop Society of Automotive Engineers guide-
lines for underground operator compartments (4). Other 
work relevant to the project includes a report by MSHA 
on injuries associated with roof or rib bolting (5), an 
MSHA-generated job safety analysis on roof bolter opera-
tions (6), and a privately published manual on how to roof 
bolt safely using boom-style bolters (7). The reference 
section at the end of this report lists these and other 
studies. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTIONS 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
As a result of the data-collection and analysis efforts, 
the project team decided that the goal of any intervention 
should focus on reducing the likelihood of a roof bolter 
operator being crushed by the boom or mast of a bolting 
machine. Based on this general criteria and working from 
a human factors perspective, the team developed a list of 
possible solutions: 
1. Perform a crewstation redesign with a greater em-
phasis on operator reach and visibility requirements. 
2. Use an automatic resin insertion device. 
3. Reposition or redesign personal protective equip-
ment so that it is less likely to bump or become tangled in 
the controls. 
4. Reduce the likelihood of the drill steel jamming 
through better maintenance and drill shaft designs. 
5. Redesign the control bank to couform to accepted 
ergonomic principles. 
6. Place fIxed barriers at pinch points and other 
dangerous areas. 
7. Reduce the speed of the drill-head boom fast-feed 
lever. 
3Helander, M, G., and E. J. Conway. Design and Develop Stand-
ardized Controls on Roof Bolting Machines, Phase I Specifications 
Report. Canyon Research Group, (undated), 87 pp. 
4B1ake, T., M. Sanders, O. Krohn, D. Wick, K. Volkmer, and 
B. Seith. Experiments on Personal Equipment for Low Seam Coal 
Miners: lV. Incorporating Coiled Cord Into Cap Lamp Battery Cords. 
Can~n Research Group, Jan. 1980, 24 pp. 
OPR 113-93g. Coal Mine Inquiry Analysis: A Model for Reduc-
tion Through Training. Volume III-Accident Risk During Roof Bolt-
ing Cycle: Analysis of Problems and Potential Solutions by M. 1. K1ishis, 
R C. Althouse, T. J. Stobbe, R. W. Plummer, R. L. Grayson, L. A. 
Layne, and G. M. Lies. 
8. Provide appropriate control guarding. 
9. Use an interlock device to cut off power to controls 
when the operator is out of position. 
10. Use automatic cutoff switches at pinch points and 
other dangerous areas. 
11. Use resin insertion tools and resin cartridge 
retainers. 
After further study, it was determined that solutions 1 
through 4 would require extensive effort to design and im-
plement. For this reason, they were classified as extended-
term solutions. Short-term solutions were identified as 
those that could be implemented nsing existing technolo-
gies and would not require significant machine redesign or 
time to implement. Solutions 5 through 11 were classified 
as short-term solutions. The short-term solutions were 
ranked using AHP as outlined in the following section. 
CRITERIA FOR RANKING SOLUTIONS 
AHP was nsed to rank the proposed solutions. AHP is 
a theory of measurement for dealing with quantifiable 
and/or intangible criteria. It is based on the principle 
that to make decisions, experience and knowledge of 
people is at least as valuable as the data they use (3). 
This process requires that criteria or standards by which 
solutions are to be judged are established. The sections 
that follow provide information regarding the weight given 
to various factors in the ranking process. The amount of 
weight given to the various criteria was obtained through 
a process of consensus by the project team. Three major 
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categories were considered in rating the proposed solu-
tions: (1) ability of the proposed solution to effectively 
protect the operator, (2) ability of the solution to be im-
plemented in a timely fashion, and (3) the costs associated 
with the proposed solution in terms of installation, main-
tenance, and operating expense. Within each of these 
categories there were several criteria used to evaluate how 
well the proposed solutions would achieve these three ma-
jor goals. Table 3 gives a breakdown of the eriteria and 
the weight given to each in the ranking process. 
Protection of Operator 
Protection of the operator received highest priority by 
the project team. In fact, 65% of the total score for each 
proposed solution was based on the ability of the solution 
to protect the worker from being crushed by the drill 
boom or mast. The criterion judged most important in 
terms of operator protection was the ability of the solution 
to keep the operator out of boom-mast pinch points. If an 
operator can be effectively removed from a pinch point, it 
was reasoned, accidental activation of the controls would 
not have a catastrophic impact. The ability of the solution 
to reduce the likelihood of accidental activation of controls 
was rated as the second most important criterion in terms 
of protecting the worker. Finally, solutions were evaluated 
in terms of whether they might reduce or increase the 
mental or physiological stress (workload), thereby reducing 
or increasing the likelihood of accidental injury. The latter 
criterion received least weight. 
Table 3.-Categorles and criteria used to evaluate proposed solutions 
Category Criterion 
Protection (65%) ............................... . 
Pinch pOints (63%) .............. . 
Accidental activation (22%) ..•...... 
Mental or physiological workload (15%) 
Time (21%) 
Hardware setup (67%) 
Implementation (33%) 
Cost (14%) ................................... . 
Instailation (20%) ............... . 
Maintenance (20%) .............. . 
Operational (60%) .........•..... 
Description 
Ability of solution to protect operator from crushing Injuriss. 
Ability of solution to keep operators out of pinch pOints. 
Ability of solution to prevent accidental activation of roof bolter con-
trols, 
Ukelihood of solution not to increase mental or physiologicaf stress. 
Ability of solution to be implemented in a timely fashion. 
Time necessary for development and Installation of proposed solu-
tion. 
Time required for operator to properly learn to use proposed solu-
tion. 
Cost of solution In terms of Installation, maintenance, and operation. 
Installation cost of proposed solution. 
Maintenance cost associated with solution. 
Operating cost, training cost, and effect on productivity of proposed 
solution, 





While the project team felt that the protection of the 
operator was the most important characteristic of a pro-
posed solution, it also considered the time associated with 
carrying out the solution an important factor. Obviously, 
worker exposure to hazardous situations can be greatly re-
duced if the solution can be implemented quickly. Thus, 
the time necessary for full implementation of the solution 
was factored into the ranking process. Full implementa-
tion time consisted of both the time necessary for hard-
ware development and setup and the time required for the 
operator to learn to use the proposed solution once it 
became operational The time estimates were based on 
the knowledge and experience of the project team. This 
factor accounted for 21% of the total score. 
Cost 
The cost associated with the solutions was also rec-
ognized as an important factor to consider in the evalua-
tion process. As shown in table 3, the project team 
considered the costs associated with installation and main-
tenance, as well as the operational costs of the alternatives. 
The cost factor comprised 14% of the total score in rank-
ing the solutions. The costs of the proposed alternative on 
operating costs (or cycle costs) received the greatest 
weight in this category (60% of the cost factor), followed 
by maintenance costs (20%), and installation costs (20%). 
The cost estimates were based on the knowledge and ex-
perience of the project team. 
Once the weights of the criteria were developed, the 
alternative solutions were compared in a pair-wise fashion 
with respect to only one criterion at a time. For example, 
two proposed solutions wonld be compared, considering 
only how each resolves keeping the operator out of pinch 
points. The project team decided by what factor one solu-
tion out performed the other according to this ,criterion. 
Comparisons continned until all combinations of alterna-
tives were exhausted. Next, the alternatives were com-
pared two at a time with respect to inadvertent actuation 
of the controls, and so on. Calculations were then made 
to derive overall priorities for each proposed solution. A 
relative weight was given to each proposed solution based 
on the calcnlations, where the weights of all the alterna-
tives snmmed to uoity. The fmal ranked solutions are 
listed in table 4. 
The next section discusses the ranked short-term solu-
tions proposed by the USBM for reducing the likelihood 
of a roof bolter operator being crushed by the drill boom 
or mast of a bolting machine. Any design changes made 
to a roof bolting machine based on these recommenda-
tions need to be evaluated to (1) make sure it is effective 
and (2) make sure there are no new hazards created. 
Table 4.-Solutions ranked using AHP 
Rank Solution Relative weight 
Use an Interlock device to cut off power to 0.239 
controls when operator Is out of position. 
2 Provide fixed barriers at pinch pOints and 0.166 
other dangerous areas. 
3 Provide better control guarding ........... 0.153 
4 Reduce speed of fastfeed ............... 0.127 
5 " Use automatic cutoff switches for pinch points 0.125 
and other dangerous areas. 
6 RedeSign control bank to conform to accepted 0.112 
ergonomic principles. 
7 Use resin insertion tools and resin cartridge re- o.on 
tainers. 
AHP Analytic hierarchy process. 
DISCUSSION OF SOLUTIONS 
The seven short-term solutions are discussed in order 
of rank, followed by a brief discussion of the extended· 
term solutions. In addition, the USBM feels that it is im-
portant to increase the miners' awareness of the hazard. 
of roof bolting through additional task-specific operator 
training. Such training needs to be given for each phase 
of the roof bolting cycle. Should any roof bolters be modi-
fied based on the recommendations in this report, the op-
erators need to be retrained to do their jobs on the modi-
fied equipment 
SOLUTION 1: USE INTERLOCK DEVICE TO CUT 
OFF POWER TO CONTROLS WHEN OPERATOR 
IS OUT OF POSITION 
To reduce the risk of an operator being crushed, an 
interlock device should be installed on all roof bolters that 
would prevent the movement of the boom or drill mast 
when the operator has left the designated operating area. 
An interlock device is a common safety feature used to 




certain condition exits. There are two general categories: 
those that must be activated for motion or action to occur 
( deadman controls) and those, which upon activation, will 
stop motion or action (automatic cutoff switches) (dis-
cussed in the section "Solution 5: Use Automatic Cutoff 
Switches at Pinch Points"). One form of deadman control 
that may effectively prevent an operator from accidentally 
engaging the fast-feed lever is a two-handed control 
mechanism. Requiring the use of a two-handed fast feed 
would also help to keep the operator within the safe work 
area and away from the drill boom while it is in motion. 
Careful consideration must go into the design and use of 
this system to ensure that the two-handed control cannot 
be overridden casually by the operator (figure 1). To 
discourage circumvention, other drill functions, such as 
drill rotation, may have to be disabled while the fast feed 
is engaged. Also, the operator must be able to complete 
required tasks effectively while using both hands for the 
fast feed. (An official from F1etcher has stated that all its 
new machines will use a two-handed fast feed and that 
retrofit kits will be available for machines already in use.) 
Setting up a general deadman device to control the 
drill-head motion functions would be another way to en-
sure that the operator is within a designated safe area 
when operating a roof bolting machine. Possible devices 
include a foot pedal, a weight -sensitive platform, or a rail 
to which the operator must apply light pressure to activate 
the motion functions of the machine. Again, care must be 
taken in designing a deadman device to ensure that no 
new hazards are introduced and to ensure that a bolter 
operator can effectively perform the job. One item that 
must be addressed is to ensure that the device will not 
Figure 1 
Positioning deadnum switch too close to fast-feed lever 
allows operator to activate both with one hand. 
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fatigue the operator because of awkward body position 
required to keep the deadman switch engaged. 
SOLUTION 2: PLACE FIXED BARRIERS 
AT PINCH POINTS 
Roof bolting machines have many moving parts that 
create pinch points. All pinch points on the machine 
should be marked with reflective warning labels. Labels 
need to be cleaned regularly so that they are always vis-
ible. One very effective and inexpensive way to protect the 
operator from being caught in a pinch point is to place a 
stationary obstruction between the worker and the hazard 
(figure 2). The design of fixed barriers must be thought 
out carefully so that the operators do not expose them-
selves to other hazards while attempting to work around 
the barrier. Barriers must be difficult for the operator to 
circumvent, i.e., fasteners for fixed barriers should be of 
a type not easily removed, and the barriers themselves 
should be made as rugged as possible. A barrier should 
not cause the operator to assume awkward postures, and 
it should not further restrict visibility. Finally, it should 
not force the operator into another pinch point area to 
perform bolting tasks. 
SOLUTION 3: PROVIDE APPROPRIATE 
CONTROL GUARDING 
A simple and inexpensive way to help prevent inadvert-
ent activation of a control is to provide appropriate control 
guarding. A guard is a barrier that prevents any part of 
the body from inadvertently entering the control area. For 
Figure 2 
Heavy steel tool tray welded onto HDDR bolter by mine 
personnel provides fixed barrier to mast pinch poinL 
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roof bolters, it should also prevent falls of the roof or rib 
or other objects (tools, drill steels, resin boxes; etc.) from 
activating a control (figure 3). A well-designed control 
guard for roof bolters must have certain characteristics. 
First, it must impose no new restrictions, discomforts, or 
difficulties for the worker. It must automatically move 
into or be fixed in place. If adjustable, it must not move 
out of alignment easily. It should be designed specifically 
for the machine, the type of operations to be conducted, 
and the hazards that are present. It should in no way 
restrict access to emergency shutoffs. Finally, it should be 
easy to inspect and maintain. 
SOLUTION 4: REDUCE FAST-FEED SPEED 
Fastfeed is a feature that bolter operators use primarily 
when installing resin bolts to prevent the resin from setting 
up before the bolt has been completely inserted into the 
hole. However, many roof bolter operators speed up the 
bolting process by using it to lower the boom quickly when 
extracting drill steels and after installing a bolt. 
Figure 4 compares the fast- and slow-feed speeds for 







Unguarded controls are more likely to be activated by roof 
or rib falls. 
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FEED SPEED, cm/s 
Average fast- and slow-feed speeds for roof bolters. 
.... 55.6 
48.3 
conducted in West Virginia. The chart shows a wide vari-
ation in fast-feed speeds, with some roof bolter models 
having no fast-feed feature. When the necessary time is 
considered for operators to remove themselves from drill 
boom or mast pinch points, these fast-feed speeds may be 
excessive, particularly in low-seam heights where there is 
less room to maneuver. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
determine what is a safe fast-feed speed. It depends on 
many variables, such as the machine configuration, the op-
erator's workspace, and the ability of the operator to react 
in an emergency situation. 
Until further research can be done to determine "safe" 
fast-feed speeds, or other measures are taken to ensure 
that roof bolter operators cannot become pinched by the 
drill boom or mast of a roof bolting machine, it would be 
prudent to limit the fast-feed speed on roof bolters. Since 
the slow-feed speed is limited by factors related to bit life 
and the hardness of the overhead strata, it may be reason-
able to limit the fast-feed speed to some mUltiple of the 
slow-feed speed. As an example, table 5 illustrates the 
effect of limiting the fast-feed speed to two times the slow-
feed speed. Another alternative would be for individual 
miners to do their own time studies to determine the im-
pact of lowering the fast-feed speed and using a slower 
acting resin. 
This solution does nothing to keep the operator out of 
pinch points created by the drill boom or mast, or to pre-
vent the inadvertent actuation of controls. However, it 
may increase their chances of escaping a hazard once they 
become aware of it. 
Table 5.-Effects of limiting fast-feed speed on roof bolters 
to two times slow-feed speed 
Speed, cm/s 
Difference, 
Roof bolter Current Current New fast- % 
fast feed slow feed feed limits 
Eimco 3510 ... NAp 26.54 NAp NAp 
Fletcher 
DD().13 51.56 20.62 41.25 -20.00 
Fletcher 
DD().15 51.41 19.56 39.12 -23.91 
Fletcher RR II .. 55.63 20.29 40.59 -27.03 
Lee Norse 
TD2 ........ 41.55 19.76 39.52 -4.89 
. Long-Airdox 
LRB-15A ..... NAp 21.33 NAp NAp 
Simmons Rand 
RB2-52A ... . . 25.4 17.01 34.04 34.00 
Simmons Rand 
SR-200A ..... 48.26 19.30 38.61 -20.00 
Simmons Rand 
TDI-SL ....... 40.64 20.32 40.64 0.00 
Average ... 17.69 8.08 15.40 -12.94 
NAp Not applicable. 
SOLUTION 5: USE AUTOMATIC CUTOFF 
SWITCHES AT PINCH POINTS 
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An automatic cutoff switch is another form of the inter-
lock device discussed earlier. In contrast to a deadman 
control, an automatic cutoff switch will stop motion or ac-
tion only upon its activation. 
Two fatal accidents involving Fletcher HDDR walk-
through bolters occurred when the operators placed them-
selves over the drill mast in an attempt to retrieve a drill 
steel that had become jammed in the rib. While in this 
position, the fast-feed lever on the control bank was acti-
vated, causing the drill mast to move. The operators were 
crushed between the advancing drill head and the frame of 
the machine. Because of these accidents, Fletcher has de-
signed an automatic cutoff switch for the HDDR roof bolt-
er. It consists of a bar extending the entire length of the 
control bank and through to the pinch point between the 
drill-head mast and the machine frame. If the operator 
presses on the bar, it immediately deactivates the hydraulic 
controls, stopping all motion of the drill head (figure 5). 
Installing such an automatic cutoff is a relatively simple 
task on the HDDR roof bolter because of the straightfor-
ward design of its operator station. Unfortunately, other 
roof bolting machines, such as the Fletcher Roof Ranger 
II, do not have fixed operator platforms. These machines 
typically have the drill head mounted on the end of a 
boom that raises and lowers. With no convenient locations 
to mount a cutoff switch, the feasibility of applying this 
solution to these types of machines is more difficult. A 
significant human factors and mechanical design effort 
would be necessary to develop mechanical cutoff switches 
Figure 5 
Hydraulic safety bar installed on Fletcher HDDR roof bolter 
that acts as control guard and automatic cutoff switch. 
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for boom-style machin~s. Some issues that would have to 
be considered include making the switch fail safe, design-
ing the switch to minimize inadvertent activations (other-
wise, the operator may disable it), and ensuring that the 
switch does not interfere with other controls. 
One idea for an automatic cutoff that may warrant 
further research would be to place infrared sender and 
receiver proximity switches along the drill boom. These 
switches would be set up to disable drill boom movement 
whenever the beam was broken. An infrared switch con-
sists of two parts: a sender unit and a receiver unit. The 
sender unit sends out a beam of infrared light. The re-
ceiver unit "sees" this beam and sends out a signal accord-
ingly. The signal would be used to control the hydraulic 
oil reaching the boom raise cylinder. If any part of the 
operator's body would come close to the boom and break 
the infrared beam (while installing resin, retrieving a stuck 
drill steel, etc.), the boom would not move even if the 
controls were activated. 
Of course, this equipment would have to be rugged and 
capable of surviving in the underground environment. 
Furthermore, all electronics would have to be intrinsically 
safe and MSHA approved. Thus, setting up this system 
may best be completed at the manufacturing level rather 
than retrofitted in the field. 
SOLUTION 6: REDESIGN CONTROL BANK 
TO CONFORM TO ACCEPTED 
ERGONOMIC PRINCIPLES 
There has been a significant amount of research done 
on the design of controls for mobile equipment (8-10), and 
at least one study was conducted that looked specifically at 
the design of controls for roof bolters (Helander and Con-
way).6 Some general fmdings from that previous work, as 
well as the application of human factors principles to 
mining (11) are discussed as follows: 
1. Controls should be coded by sequence, location, and 
shape so that they can easily be distinguished. Figures 6 
and 7 depict examples of control shapes. According to 
Helander and Conway, coding by sequence and location is 
important because people are good at remembering where 
items are located in the space around them. One way that 
sequence and location coding can be accomplished is by 
arranging controls into functional groups. Controls should 
also be labeled clearly. Coding according to color is not 
considered practical in the underground mine environment. 
~ork cited in footnote 3. 
Figure 6 
Knob shapes that can be recognized by touch by operators 
















Suggested knob shapes for roof bolters that relate to function 
being controlled. 
2. Whether or not it is correct to mirror image controls 
for dual-boom bolters (figure 8) is being debated. One 
study reports that either mirror image or place arrange-
ment is acceptable. However, another study suggests that 
when the operator on the left side operates the controls 
with the right hand and the operator on the right side uses 
the left hand, the mirror-image arrangement decreases the 
time the operator needs to adjust to a switch in sides. 
3. The direction of control movement should be 
according to control movement stereotypes (table 6). 
4. Where practical, the number of controls should be 
reduced by combining control functions into one control. 
(Fletcher now offers a joystick control option on its Roof 
Ranger model that combines drill rotation with drill feed.) 
S. Optimum control resistance is approximately 44 to 
67 N (10 to 1S lbt) for controls operated with full-arm 
motion and the hand. 
6. For controls operated with the forearm and hand 
only, the minimum resistance is 22 N (Slbt), and for hand-
operated controls, the minimum resistance is 9 N (2 lbt). 
In addition to the above, control layouts for the same 
model of roof bolting machine should be identical on a 
per-mine basis to avoid problems related to adjusting to 
different control layouts. 
Another important aspect of control design is main-
tenance and maintainability. Sloppy control linkages have 
been implicated in many injuries and several fatalities. 
Control linkages should be inspected before every shift, 
and loose or broken linkages should be repaired immedi-
ately. Controls should be designed to allow easy visual 
inspection and should use components that can withstand 
the mine environment. 
The reference section at the end of this report contains 
many references related to control design. If a roof bolt-
ing machine's controls are modified based on the recom-
mendations in this report, then it is imperative that the 
bolter operators be retrained on the modified equipment. 
Table a.-Typical control movement stereotypes 
Function Direction of movement 
On . . . . . . . . . . . Up, right, forward, clockwise, pull. 
Off . . . . . . . . . . . Down, left, rearward, counterclockwise, push. 
Right ......... Clockwise, right. 
Left .......... Counterclockwise, left. 
Raise . . . . . . . . . Up, back. 
Lower ........ Down, forward. 
Retract. . . . . . . . Up, rearward, pull. 
Extend . . . . . . . . Down, forward, push. 
Increase. . . . . . . Forward, up, right, clockwise. 
Decrease ...... Rearward, down, left, counterclockwise. 
SOLUTION 7: USE RESIN INSERTION TOOLS 
AND RESIN CARTRIDGE RETAINERS 
Operators of both boom- and mast-type roof bolters 
have indicated difficulty installing resin cartridge( s) into 
the hole, particularly in higher seams. Consequently, they 
are compelled to climb out onto the drill mast or boom to 
reach the hole. There have also been instances of op-
erators riding the boom up to the roof to install resin. 
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The use of resin insertion tools is one alternative for 
reducing the tendency of bolter operators to position 
themselves in hazardous locations or to perform unsafe 
acts. During this analysis, the USBM learned of two 
insertion tools. One, a resin and bolt insertion device, was 
designed by the Birmingham Bolt Co. for use in truss bolt-
ing with expansion-sheIl-type bolts (figure 9). It consists 
of a variable-length polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe with a 
slot cut through its entire length. The pipe's inside diam-
eter is determined by the diameter of the expansion shell. 
The slot width is determined by the diameter of the bolt 
being used. The pipe is snug fit over the expansion shell 
and holds the resin while it is inserted into the predrilled 
hole. The bolt then acts as a plunger, forcing the resin 
into the hole. When the expansion shell enters the hole, 
the PVC pipe section drops off so that it can be recovered 
and reused. 
The other insertion tool was designed by Fletcher 
(figure 10). It consists of a variable-length, 91- to 3OS-cm 
Figure 8 
1/' Drilling head ~ 
, 1 " 4 
2 ~2 2® 3 
3 ,. 3 2 
4 ,4 4 • 
Mirror image Place arrangement 
Two dual-boom bolter layouts illustrating mirror image and 
place arrangement of controls (1 through 4). 
Figure 9 
Resin transfer tube designed by Binningham Bolt. 
14 
(36- to 12O-in) PVC pipe with a slot cut in it that allows a Figure 10 
hinged handle (used as a plunger) to push a tube( s) of 
resin into a predrilled bolt hole. 
Any resin insertion device must be inexpensive so that 
it will be practical to have available at the section. The 
device must also be easy to use and provide a definite 
advantage over having the roof bolter operator to climb 
out onto the drill mast or boom to reach the hole. 
The USBM has learned of two in-hole retaining de-
vices for tubes of resin that are available from resin 
manufacturers-the "clip" and the "parachute" (figure 11). 
The clip (made by Celtite Mining Div., Fosroc Inc.) is a 
2.3-cm (0.94-in) square piece of plastic, 0.2 cm (0.08 in) 
thick, with a 2.1-cm (0.83-in) hole in the middle. The 
(daisy) parachute made by E. I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., Inc., resembles a badminton cock; it is 5.2 cm 
(2.04 in) long and 2.8 cm (1.10 in) in diameter. Both the 
clip and the parachute are used almost exclusively in non-
coal mining, particularly hard-rock mining in Canada. The 
parachute is designed specifically for the pneumatic, semi-
automatic insertion feature of Secoma U.S. Inc.'s bolting 
machines. The clips and parachutes come preassembled 
on the resin cartridges, although the manufacturer will 
provide them separately if the customer desires. The extra 
cost of using the clips and parachutes is approximately 
15% and 20% to 25% of the cost of the resin, respectively. 
EXTENDED-TERM SOLUTIONS 
The following unranked solutions would require exten-
sive effort to implement. However, the ideas discussed 
have great potential to increase the general safety of roof 
bolting. 
Perform Overall Crewstation Redesign 
Based on mine and manufacturer visits, it appears that 
many of the crewstations for roof bolters have been de-
signed with production considerations foremost. The op-
erators' needs have been met only after the basic layout of 
the machine has been completed. Thus, the operator has 
to lean over the control panel to retrieve a drill steel, or 
position himself or herself over the boom to insert a drill 
steel. 
Our suggested approach to solving this problem is to 
perform a thorough analysis of roof bolting tasks to better 
define the needs of operators and to identify how tasks can 
be completed safely and efficiently. Some factors that 
need further study (through literature reviews, laboratory 
experimentation and task analysis) include-
• Visibility and illumination: What does the roof bolt-
er operator need to see (drill head, hole, controls) and in 
what detail? 
Resin insertion assist designed by Fletcher. 
Figure 11 
Resin retaining devices: clip (top) and porachuJe (bottom). 
• Noise and communication: Who does the operator 
need to communicate with while bolting (other bolters), 
and what information must be transferred? 
• Postural analysis: What postures are best for a giv-
en seam height and workload (sitting, kneeling, prone)? 
" j 
j 
• Reach accommodation: What controls need to be 
handled and at what frequency, what tools need to be 
handled, and what needs to be reached from the crew-
station (mine roof, rib) to perform the task? 
Once there is a thorough understanding of the task and 
the operators' needs, it is possible to begin to design a 
crewstation and machine that meet those requirements. It 
is likely that many of the more hazardous operator re-
quirements can be designed out of the system once the 
engineers have a better understanding of what the machine 
needs to do. For instance, design engineers have to under-
stand the potential hazards associated with removing a 
jammed drill steel. They need to consider the force re-
quired to remove the steel, the frequency of its occurring, 
and the tendency for operators to take the easiest path to 
the. steel (over the controls). 
Reposition-Redesign 
Personal Protective Equipment 
In tight quarters, personal protective equipment is more 
likely to bump or become tangled in the roof bolter con-
trols, possibly causing an inadvertent activation. One solu-
tion is to provide designated areas on the bolter for storing 
the operator's person wearable self-contained self-rescuer 
(PWSCSR) so that it need not be carried at all times. 
This could be expedited by using a carrying harness that 
simplifies attaching and detaching the PWSCSR to the 
miner's belt. The storage area would have to be designed 
to provide quick and easy access to the PWSCSR. An-
other alternative is to develop a carrying harness that 
positions the PWSCSR so that it no longer interferes with 
roof bolter controls. 
A possibility for reducing the chances that a control will 
be activated if it is snagged by the cap lamp cord is to use 
the coiled cord concept (4) developed by the USBM (fig-
ure 12). A more extreme idea (that would require further 
study) would be to improve the lighting systems on bolters 
(spot and area lighting) so that personal cap lamps are not 
necessary for bolter operation. Designated areas would be 
provided on the bolter for storing a cap lamp so that it is 
not necessary for the operator to carry it at all times. As 
with the PWSCSR, a carrying harness that simplifies at-
taching the lamp battery pack to the miners' belt would be 
a possibility. 
Miners today wear a wide range of outer garments, 
ranging from old street clothes to expensive coveralls, 
that have not been tailored to the mine environment or 
mining tasks. Few mine operators regulate the work 
clothes worn by their miners beyond requiring a snug fit 
around the ankles. In one of the most hazardous work 
environments known, a miner may be permitted at the 
worksite in blue jeans and a T-shirt. Perhaps bolter 
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Figure 12 
USBM coiled cap lamp cord concept 
operators need clothing that minimizes the chance of snag-
ging a control, such as tighter fitting coveralls or jackets. 
Also related to personal protective equipment, roof 
bolter operators working in lower seam heights spend a 
large percentage of their time on their knees. In high-
production sections, such as extended-cut sections, where 
there is pressure for the bolter operator to keep pace with 
the continuous miner, roof bolter operators have less op-
portunity to stretch and rest their legs. There is evidence 
that one of the most frequently occurring problems for 
lower seam bolter operators is damage to the knees. 
There were 64 accidents involving roof bolter operators 
injuring their knees in 1993. Uncomfortable postures may 
lead some operators to assume positions that relieve the 
pain in their legs, but expose them to pinch point hazards. 
Because of the need to reach bolts and tools, insert 
resin, and adjust the position of the machine, it may be 
impractical to construct a crewstation that allows the oper-
ator to sit while bolting in low seams. However, it should 
be possible to provide bolter operators with knee pads that 
take advantage of new cushioning materials that are more 
suited to the bolting task. Also, an adaptation of a device 
used by carpet layers (a combination knee pad-stool) may 
work in low-seam mines. 
Reduce Likelihood of Drill Steel Jamming 
During drilling operations, drill steels can become 
caught in the hole. There are several reasons why this 
could happen: (1) The bolter operator may not be drilling 
a straight hole; (2) the strata could be moving and could 
bind the drill steel; (3) there could be water that could 






inadequate. In any event, the bolter operator must re-
trieve the drill steels, often forcing the operator to get in 
a position considered unsafe (such as crawling out onto 
the boom, or reaching or leaning out beyond the protective 
canopy) to retrieve the steel. 
The Helander and Conway study7 found that initial mis-
alignment of drill steels is a primary reason why they get 
stuck. Using a deep chuck and drill guide may help im-
prove the initial alignment. Unfortunately, drill guides are 
in a vulnerable location and are high-maintenance items. 
Since they are not critical to the drilling cycle, they are 
often not repaired when damaged. A disadvantage of us-
ing deep chucks is that, unless the initial alignment is 
correct (difficult to do unless the floor is horizontal), the 
steel will bind in the hole unless the roof bolter boom is 
repositioned while drillingB (figure 13). 
One possible solution is to make the drill steel shaft 
smaller than the bit. This would cause the hole to be 
slightly larger than the shaft, making it less likely to jam. 
However, after checking with several ground control ex-
perts, it was decided that this solution is limited by current 
technology. The smallest diameter of drill steel needed to 
maintain strength is approximately 2.22 cm (7/8 in). For 
a 2.54-cm (l-in) hole, this is the smallest diameter that can 
be used for the drill steel. 
Better maintenance procedures may reduce the jam-
ming problem. If the dust bins and filters are not cleaned 
out regularly, there may be a decrease in suction power. 
The maximum vacuum can be maintained if the dust bins 
and filters are checked and cleaned regularly as part of the 
normal preshift inspection. Suction hoses also need to be 
inspected regularly for cuts and excessive wear. Switching 
to water-dust-suppression systems may help to eliminate 
the dust dogging. Unfortunately, water drilling is messy 
and many roof bolter operators do not like it. 
Use Automatic Resin Insertion Devices 
Ultimately, the hazards associated with resin insertion 
are best handled by eliminating the task altogether. Al-
though there are no fully automatic methods of resin in-
sertion available, semiautomatic insertion methods exist. 
Two are made by Fletcher and Secoma for roof bolters 
7Work cited in footnote 3. 
Bwork cited in footnote 5. 
Figure 13 
<I 
MISalignment increases when boom goes from position 1 to 
position 2 unless roof bolter is moved forward. 
used predominantly in noncoal, hard-rock mining opera-
tions. With the Secoma machine, the bolter operator 
feeds tubes of resin into an injection hose from the oper-
ator compartment to the predrilled hole by compressed 
air. The Fletcher roof bolters, also described as "roof-
referenced, double-extending mast machines," are being 
used by mine operators in the northern West Virginia-
Maryland area. These machines insert resin tubes semi-
automatically and remotely using a mechanical mechanism. 
A basic requirement of using these machines, however, is 
sufficient working height. (The Fletcher machine uses a 
resin retainer that resembles the plastic cap commonly 
used to protect the ends of pipe. According to Fletcher, 
these are relatively inexpensive, e.g., several thousand for 
under $100. The retainers are assembled by the bolter op-
erator, not by the resin manufacturer.) 
Research efforts are under way to develop automated 
bolting systems, including work by the USBM. This re-
search is in the early stages of development and is not 
addressed in this report. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implementation of the following recommendations 
could significantly reduce roof bolting injuries related to 
the movement of the drill-head boom or mast of roof bolt-
ing machines. 
1. Implement as many of the following ranked short-
term solutions as possible. (After any modifications are 
made to roof bolting equipment, operators must be re-
trained to do their jobs using the modified equipment.) 
a. Use a deadman interlock device to cut off power 
to the controls when the operator is out of position. 
b. Place fixed barriers at pinch points and other 
dangerous areas. 
c. Provide better control guarding. 
d. Reduce the fast-feed speed. 
e. Use automatic cutoff switches for pinch points 
and other dangerous areas. 
f. Redesign the control bank to conform to accept-
ed ergonomic principles. 
g. Use resin insertion tools and resin cartridge re 
tainers. 
2. Increase mine worker awareness of the hazards 
of roof bolting through additional task-specific operator 
training. 
3. Perform a study to determine the maximum safe 
speed for equipment appendages (booms, conveyors, stab 
jacks, etc.) in the underground workplace. 
4. Incorporate the following long-term solutions into 
the design of future generations of roof bolting equipment 
and, where feasible, examine the possibility of modifying 
existing equipment. 
a. Perform a crewstation redesign with greater em-
phasis on operator reach and visibility requirements. 
b. Reposition-redesign personal protective equip 
ment so that it is less likely to bump or become tangled 
in controls. 
c. Reduce the likelihood of the drill steel getting 
caught in the hole through better maintenance and drill 
shaft designs. 
d. Use automatic resin insertion devices. 
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Roof Bolter Operator Interview Form 
Interviewer: _________________ _ ID: ______ _ 
Date: 
We are researchers from the U.S. Bureau of Mines in Pittsburgh, PA. We want to learn more about roof bolting 
operations. In particular, we want to determine if there are safety problems associated with roof bolting. If there are 
problems, we want to help develop solutions to them. Since you have fIrst-hand experience we consider you the expert 
and want to hear what you have to say about your personal experience. Your name will not be associated with any 
information you provide and your participation is completely voluntary. 
1. Demographic Information 
a. Age: b. Sex: 
c. Total Years Underground Mining Experience: 
d. Total Years Mining Experience at This Mine: 
e. Job Classification: 
f. Total Years Experience in Current Job at This Mine: 
g. Height: 
h. Weight: 
1. Right handed: ____ _ Left handed: 
2. Work Methods and Mining Conditions 
a. Please describe your normal job duties. 
b. Please tell me, step by step, how you bolt roof. (Note: May want to record during a demo.) 
c. Are there any physical conditions in the mine that make baIting difficult (YIN)? 
(Probes: water, soft bottom, roof, rib, methane, ventilation) 
d. What are the biggest obstacles you face when operating a roof baIter? 
(Probes: reach, visibility, steel handling, resin insertion, position of controls) 










3. Roof Bolting Training 
a. Did you receive on-the-job training (from an experienced person)? (YIN) 
b. Did you receive vocational-technical training? (YIN) 
c. Did you receive written job procedures? (YIN) 
d. Did you receive any other type of training? (Y IN) 
e. In your own words, briefly describe the type of training that you received when you learned to operate a roof 
bolter. 
f. How long did it take to learn your job? 
g. Did you have any difficulties in learning your job? Please explain. 
h. Could your roof bolter training have been beller? (YIN) 
If so, how? 
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4. Control Layout and Design 
a. Are any modifications made in bolting machines after they come from the manufacturer? (YIN) 
If yes, what are these modifications? (Probes: guards, safety bars, hydraulics, control position, other devices) 
b. Are you satisfied with the controls on the roof bolters that you use? (YIN) 
(Probes: type, layout, location) 
If not, why not? 
What would you do to make them better? 
c. Have you ever heard of anyone accidently activating a control lever? (YIN) 
If yes, what control and how? 
d. What do you use the fast-feed raise feature for? 
Is it used in any other way at your mine? 
e. Do you need the fast-feed feature to do your job? (YIN) 
If yes, why? 







------~---.- -.----.--------------.- ------~-~.~ 
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5. Roof Bolting Safety Issues 
a. Are you aware of any safety problems with the bolting cycle? 
(Probes: pinch points, accidently hitting controls, boom raise speed, etc.) Please describe: 
b. What is the most dangerous part of operating a roof bolter? Please explain. 
c. How can this danger be corrected (if at all)? 
d. What is the most common injury a bolter operator may suffer? 
e. Have you had a work-related accident of any type in the last 5 years? (YIN) 
If yes, please describe. 
f. There have been at least eight roof bolter operator fatalities since 1988 when they were caught between the 
boom and either the roof or canopy-ATRS. 
How do you think an accident like this could happen? 
What do you think can be done to prevent this from happening? 
Are there any design solutions to this problem? 
Would there be any reason for an operator to position his or her head or upper body between the boom and 
canopy or roof? Please explain. 
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g. There have been two recent angle bolting fatalities. In each case, the operator reached across the control bank, 
accidently activating the fast-feed lever, causing the boom to crush him or her against the machine. Three tasks 
have been identified, which may expose an operator in this way. They are retrieving drill steels, inserting resin, 
and piloting a wrench to drill steels. 
Have you ever done truss bolting or rib bolting? (YIN) 
If yes, do you have any difficulties performing the tasks described? Please explain. 
Can you think of any other reason why an accident like this may occur? 
What do you think can be done to prevent this from happening? 
. Are there any design solutions to this problem? Please explain. 
It has been suggested that tools be developed to make these tasks easier and safer. Do you have ideas about 
what type of tools may be useful, if any? 
~-=-================~~~~~~~================== 
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6. Concluding Remarks 






Optional Questions: Comparison of Fletcher Offset Boom Versus Regular Boom 
1. Have you used both the new-style Fletcher bolter ( offset boom) and the old style? 
2. Do you think the new design is better or worse than the old design? Why? 
3. What are the best features of the new design? 
4. What are the worst things about the new design? 
5. What do you think of the two-hand operation for the fast raise lever? -Is it safer? 
Are there any problems with it? 
6. Do you think the new design gives you a better area to work in? 
7. Does it provide you with a better escapeway? 
8. Is there any difference in the speed of bolting between the two bolters? 
9. In general, do you feel that the new bolter is safer, less safe, or about the same as (he old bolter? 
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